Let Not Triepel Triumph: How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order by Peters, Anne
Let Not Triepel Triumph – How To Make
the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the
Italian Constitutional Court for a Global
Legal Order
Anne Peters 2014-12-23T14:00:00
The Italian Constiutional Court’s decision no. 238 of 22 Oct. 2014 (unofficial
translation into English) already inspired a flurry of comments in the blogosphere
(see in EJIL talk! Christian Tams (24 Oct. 2014) and Theodor Schilling (12 Nov.
2014); on the Verfassungsblog amongst others Filippo Fontanelli (27 Oct. 2014); on
Opinio Juris Andrea Pin (19 Nov. 2014); on the Völkerrechtsblog Felix Würkert (11
Dec. 2014)); see also Karin Oellers-Frahm, „Das italienische Verfassungsgericht und
das Völkerrecht: Eine unerfreuliche Beziehung“, Heidelberg Journal of International
Law 2015, issue 1.
In that Sentenza, the Corte refused to give effect to the ICJ’s judgment
(in) Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) of 3 February 2012,
in which the ICJ had upheld the principle of state immunity against allegations
of serious human rights violations of German state organs committed during the
Second World War.
Sentenza No. 238 is important not only because it concerns the persisting tension
between respecting (state) immunity and protecting human or fundamental rights
(see for a recent publication Anne Peters/Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan Oeter/Christian
Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Leiden: Brill
2015)), but – maybe even more importantly – because it concerns the relationship
between international law (in the shape of a judgment by the ICJ) and domestic law,
as applied by a domestic (constitutional) court.
Just the latest item in the sequence of domestic courts’ resistance against
decisions of international bodies  
The Corte relied on its established case-law on the effects of European Union
law, notably on the doctrine of controlimiti in order to erect a barrier to the
“introduction” of the ICJ judgment into the domestic legal order: “As was upheld
several times by this Court, there is no doubt that the fundamental principles
of the constitutional order and inalienable human rights constitute a ‘limit to the
introduction (…) of generally recognized norms of international law’ (…) and serve
as ‘counterlimits’ [controlimiti] to the entry of European Union [and now international]
law” (Sentenza No. 238, in “The law”, para. 3.2.).
The Italian controlimiti-approach to European or international court decisions is by
no means an outlier. Quite to the contrary, the Sentenza No. 238 is just one more
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building block in the wall of “protection” built up by domestic courts against “intrusion”
of international law, relying on the precepts of their national constitution. Ironically,
this front of resistance (which now deploys effects “against” Germany) had been
spearheaded by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht,
BVerfG). In the 1970s, that Court mounted critique against an insufficient respect
for human rights by the then European Community (BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974)
– Solange I) and threatened to scrutinize EC-acts against the yardstick of domestic
fundamental rights and to refuse to allow their application in Germany. In 2004,
the BVerfG denied a strictly binding effect of the ECHR and ECtHR-judgments,
and instead (only) ordered German authorites and courts to “take into account” the
Convention and Strasbourg judgments, and only within the confines of the German
Basic Law (BVerfGE 111, 307 (2004) – Görgülü).
How do these domestic decisions resemble each other and in what respects do
they differ, on a purely technical level and in their tone? Sentenza No. 238 repeats
that any international norm (or international judgment) which stands in conflict with
“principi fondamentali dell’ ordinamento costituzionale” may not be applied by
domestic institutions. The German BVerfG in Görgülü had marked the boundary of
applicability of judgments of the ECtHR with exactly the same wording (“tragende
Grundsätze der Verfassung”).
The referring court of Florence had quoted a previous constitutional judgment
pointing to the “identità” of the Italian legal order. There, the Corte had “reaffirmed
the principle that ‘the tendency of the Italian legal order to be open to generally
recognized norms of international law and international treaties is limited by the
necessity to preserve its identity; thus, first of all, by the values enshrined in the
Constitution’” (Sentenza No. 238, facts, para. 1.2., quoting Judgment No. 73/2001).
This is exactly what other European courts have done before (albeit with regard to
EU law): the Spanish Constitutional Court (declaration DTC 1/2004 of 13 December
2004, Sec. II para. 3), the French Conseil constitutionnel (décision no 2006-540
DCof 27 July 2006, para. 19) and the German Constitutional Court (2 BvE 2/08 of
30 June 2009, para. 340 
−
 Treaty of Lisbon). (See also Constitutional Court of
Lithuania, case no 17/02-24/02-06/03-22/04 on the priority of the state constitution
over EU law, 14 March 2006, sec. III. para. 9.4.).
Just like the US Supreme Court’s Medellín decision (Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491 (2008)), Sentenza No. 238 is directed against an ICJ judgment. Medellín also
had to do with constitutional principles, namely with federalism and the separation
of powers: the domestic issue here was that the US President had ordered
implementation of the ICJ Avena judgment in the different states. Medellín was
however not concerned with respect for fundamental rights of individuals. Another
difference is that Medellín held that an ICJ judgment was not in itself self-executing
but needed a federal law to be implemented domestically. Sentenza No. 238 was not
concerned with self-executingness, because Italy had, in the statute incorporating
the UN Convention on State Immunity, which was adopted after the ICJ judgment,
inserted a specific provision which obliged Italian judges to adapt themselves to
judgments of the ICJ (Law no. 5 of 14 January 2013). Exactly that provision (Art. 3)
was now declared unconstitutional.
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Sentenza No. 238 is in some way a follower of the ECJ Kadi decision (ECJ, 3
September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat, joint cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05
P, ECR 2008, I-6351), which the Corte quotes. But unlike Kadi, which mounts
resistance against the Security Council and thus against a partly unelected and not
fully representative body, Sentenza No. 238 is directed against the International
Court of Justice, a body of elected judges who represent all regions of the world
(is it enough to consider it representative?). Generally speaking, this Court has so
far enjoyed a high degree of acceptance. The de facto-disobedience to the ICJ
seems less justified as a matter of principle, and implies more serious damage to the
normativity of the international legal system than disobeying the Security Council.
Just like Kadi, Sentenza No. 238 insists on the fact that it has nothing to do with
“outbound” compliance of the state (Italy) with international law, but only concerns
the internal compatibility of two Italian laws with the Italian constitution: “The result
is a further reduction of the scope of this norm, with effects in the domestic legal
order only.” (in “The law”, para. 3.3., emphasis added). Put differently, the Corte
neatly distinguishes “internal” and “external” effects of an international norm:
“The impediment to the incorporation of the conventional norm [Article 94 of the
United Nations Charter] to our legal order – albeit exclusively for the purposes of
the present case – has no effects on the lawfulness of the external norm itself,
and therefore results in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the special law of
adaptation, insofar as it contrasts with the abovementioned fundamental principles
of the Constitution“ (in “The law“, para. 4.1, emphasis added). So technically (in
a dualist world view), the case is not about supremacy but about incorporation:
“Accordingly, the incorporation, and thus the application, of the international norm
would inevitably be precluded, insofar as it conflicts with inviolable principles and
rights. This is exactly what has happened in the present case.” (in “The law”, para.
3.4, emphasis added).
The pretense that the “internal” unconstitutionality basically does not concern
international law, and that the decision does not formally accord any priority
or supremacy to internal law is as unpersuasive as it has been in the
ECJ Kadi judgment (ECJ, Kadi, paras 287-288 and 299). That distinction between
inside and outside resonates the good old 19th century dualism as formulated by
Heinrich Triepel, according to which international law and domestic law are “two
circles which at best touch each other but which never intersect” (Heinrich Triepel,
Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Leipzig: Verlag von C. L. Hirschfeld 1899), p. 111, my
translation).
The Court’s consolation that “in any other case, it is certainly clear that the
undertaking of the Italian State to respect all of the international obligations imposed
by the accession to the United Nations Charter, including the duty to comply with the
judgments of the ICJ, remains unchanged.” (Sentenza No. 238, in “The law”, para. 4)
does not help much for managing the practical problem at stake.
What can Germany do in the short term?
Which venues are open for Germany to react lawfully against Sentenza No. 238?
First, Germany might have recourse to the UN Security Council under Art. 94(2)
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UN Charter. This provision is applicable as soon as a UN member states “fails to
perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered” by the ICJ.
The admission of complaints against Germany by Italian courts constitute such a
failure, because it disregards the procedural barrier to domestic judicial proceedings
against a state protected by immunity. Decisions of Italian courts are imputable to
Italy (cf. Art. 4 of the ILC articles on state responsibility).
A lex specialis to Art. 94(2) UN Charter seems to be Art. 39 of the European
Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, the convention
which was the jurisdictional basis for the ICJ proceedings that had led to the 2012
judgment. Under Art. 39, Germany could appeal to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, which could with a 2/3 majority “make recommendations with a
view to ensuring compliance with the (…) decision” directed at Italy.
Instead (in any case after failure of diplomatic representations), Germany
might institute a new complaint against Italy for violation of state immunity, as
authoritatively spelled out by the ICJ judgment. Remember that the ECtHR in Case
of Jones and others v. UK (appl. nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, judgment of 14 Jan.
2014) had held that the judgment of the ICJ in Germany v. Italy “must be considered
(…) as authoritative as regards the content of customary international law” (para.
197).
Res iudicata does not stand against the institution of ICJ-proceedings, because the
disregard of the ICJ judgment of 2012 constitutes a new issue. Also, the possibility
of having recourse to the Security Council under Art. 94(2) of the UN Charter does
not preclude such a complaint, because the two venues are in nature distinct (calling
on the Security Council is a political path as opposed to a judicial path) and can be
resorted to cumulatively. (On 25 Nov. 2014, one month after the Sentenza No. 238,
Italy declared its general recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ under the optional
clause of Art. 36(2) ICJ Statute), implicitly inviting a second proceeding.)
Sentenza No. 238 itself does not yet constitute an internationally wrongful act,
because it does not in itself disregard state immunity. What counts are the lower
courts’ reconsiderations of the claims, their decisions on holding them admissible by
setting aside state immunity. Arguably, already the re-opening of those proceedings,
not only decisions on their merits or the execution of a judgment, constitute
internationally wrongful acts. The content of Italian state responsibility would then be
primarily restitution in kind which would in our case mean to somehow strike down
the proceedings against Germany.
Moreover, any execution of a substantive judgment would in addition violate post-
judgment immunity against execution. The relevant parts of the pertinent provision of
Art. 19 of the UN Convention on State Immunity of 2004 seem to express customary
international law. The most attractive German object of execution, the Villa Vigoni,
is protected, because it serves governmental objectives in a wider sense, including
cultural policy, and it has a non-commercial character (ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities,
para. 119).
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Art. 60 sentence 2 of the ICJ-Statute does not prevent a new proceeding before the
ICJ, because this provison is not applicable (Cf. ICJ, Request for Interpretation of
the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), judgment of 19 January 2009). The
issue is not a one of clarifying the meaning of the ICJ judgment of 2012. There is no
“dispute as to the meaning or scope” of that judgment.
Another pertinent provision is Art. 30 of the European Dispute Settlement
Convention of 1957 which deals with the situation that the state found in breach of
international law by the ICJ does not or cannot honour the ICJ judgment: “[I]f the
municipal law of that party [in our case Italy] does not permit or only partially permits”
to make good the breach of international law found by the ICJ, “the Court (..) shall,
if necessary, grant the injured party equitable satisfaction.” But such a potential new
decision by the ICJ could only confer “equitable satisfaction”, and this is not what
serves Germany.
What should everybody (notably courts) do in the long term?
Beyond these conventional, more confrontational means of reacting to the Italian
breach of international law as it stands, all parties are advised to better prevent
and manage such regime collisions. What is needed is the further development of
procedural mechanisms of reciprocal restraint, respect, and cooperation needed for
the adjustment of competing claims of authority, in order to realize what has been
called a “pluralisme ordonné” (Mireille Delmas-Marty) – as opposed to a dualism à la
Triepel.
Domestic (constitutional) courts do and should take into consideration international
law in good faith and interpret the domestic constitution in the light of international
law. Along this line, the Corte could have interpreted the (constitutional)
right of access to a court under Art. 24 of the Italian Constitution in the light
of ECtHR, Sfountouris v Germany, appl. no. 24120/06 (31 May 2011) which implicitly
held that access to domestic courts (in Germany) in suits for damages on account
of German World War II-crimes appear to satisfy the standards of Art. 6 ECHR
(pp. 16-18; this decision on inadmissibility found a claim based on Art. 1 AP 1 in
conjunction with Art. 14 ECHR to be inadmissible ratione materiae).
The Corte could have used a more more “harmonising” approach à la Jones. Here
the ECtHR had insisted that both different issue areas of international law, the
law of immunities, and human rights law, must be reconciled, acknowledging “the
need to interpret the Convention so far as possible in harmony with other rules of
international law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State
immunity” (ECtHR, Jones para. 189). This led the ECtHR “to conclude that measures
taken by a State which reflect generally recognised rules of public international law
on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate
restriction on the right of access to a court” (ibid).
Third, the Corte could have applied the Bosphorus strategy (ECtHR, Bosphorus
v. Ireland, appl. no 45036/98, 30 June 2005). In that approach, courts should
employ a legal presumption that a legal act performed by a body rooted in “another”
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legal system is in conformity with the “own” standards, coupled with the reciprocal
recognition of such acts, “as long as” some minimum requirements are not undercut.
In this scheme, domestic courts renounce on revisiting (judicial or quasi-judicial)
decisions taken by an international body on the basis of the rebuttable presumption
that the respective international regime, or another state’s domestic legal system (in
our case Germany) offers a functionally equivalent legal protection.
Most importantly, conflicts between international law and constitutional law should
be resolved by balancing in the concrete case, not on the basis of a normative
hierarchy or the norms’ expression in international law as opposed to domestic
law. Less attention should be paid to the formal sources of law, and more to the
substance of the rules in question. The ranking and effects of the norms at stake
should be assessed in a more subtle manner, according to their substantial weight
and significance. Such a nonformalist, substance-oriented perspective implies
that on the one hand certain less significant provisions in state constitutions would
have to give way to important international norms. Inversely, fundamental rights
guarantees should prevail over less important norms (independent of their locus and
type of codification). The fundamental idea is that what counts is the substance, not
the formal category of conflicting norms. (Admittedly, this new approach does not
always offer strict guidance, because it is debatable which norms are “important” in
terms of substance). Still, such a flexible approach appears to correspond better with
the current state of global legal integration than does the idea of a strict hierarchy,
particularly in human rights matters. From this perspective, international law,
constitutional law, and other states’ constitutional law, too, find themselves in a
fluent state of interaction and reciprocal influence, based on discourse and mutual
adaptation, but not in a hierarchical relationship.
Conclusions
The stability of the inter-state system which state immunity seeks to protect is
sustainable only if it is perceived as being fair. The persistence of a de facto non-
accountability for state-sponsored crimes undermines this sustainability. Concedely,
the widespread unease about upholding immunity even against allegations of
serious human rights violations is particularly pronounced in the context of criminal
proceedings against individual officials who are suspect of being personally
responsible for ordering or commiting crimes. For example, in a criminal proceeding
in Switzerland against a former Algerian minister of defence, instituted for torture,
the Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal granted no immunity ratione personae for
acts which the minister had allegedly committed when still in office (Swiss Federal
Criminal Tribunal, decision of 25 July 2012, BBl. 2011, 140).
It is often said that the so-called “civil” (rather “public law”) proceedings against
states (adressed as juridical persons), such as the case underlying Sentenza No.
238, should in normative terms be assessed differently from criminal proceedings
against individuals, and that – if at all – a human rights exception is more appropriate
in the latter context. I hesitate to agree. In cases of torture and the like, the criminals
are normally office holders whose actions are imputable to states, so that both
tracks (individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility) will normally be
pursued in parallel. From the perspective of the victim, it is not self-evident that the
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claim against a juridical person which seeks a statement of state responsibility and
damages should be less worthy of being honoured than the request for a criminal
penalty against a perpetrator. For example, the recent important ECtHR case, Jones
v. UK, was a case on state immunity (involving Saudi Arabia) against allegations of
torture. Here the ECtHR observed that “in light of the developments currently under
way in this area of public international law, this is a matter which needs to be kept
under review” (para. 215). However, in comparison to such type of dispute about
torture of current or recent regimes, the issue of the Italian prisoners of war makes
a bad case for two reasins. First, an international law-based entitlement of victims of
of violations of the law of armed conflict to financial compensation is still denied by
most domestic courts. Second, the claim concerns crimes committed more than one
generation ago. Even if we do not accept any formal prescription for the prosecution
of such egregious crimes, the lapse of time does weaken the claims.
Is the openness of the question “who decides who decides” and the lack of an
ultimate authority – in our context for example a tribunal sitting over and above the
ICJ and the Italian Corte Costituzionale – a merit of the global order? In theory, such
openness constitutes an additional mechanism for limiting power and seems to allow
for a heterarchical adjustment of regimes. Within this paradigm, the constitutional
resistance of the Corte Costituzionale might be interpreted as the pulling of an
“emergency brake” whose availability had been the pre-condition for the opening-up
of the states’ constitutions towards the international sphere in the first place. Along
this line, one could argue that – in the absence of a super-arbiter 
−
 the Italian courts
are entitled to act as “guardians” of rights of the victims or their descendants “as
long as” a customary human rights exception to state immunity has not cristallized
or until a special agreement between Germay and Italy, on a special indemnation
programme or a special claims tribunal, has been concluded.
In the long run, reasonable resistance by national actors – if it is exercised
under respect of the principles for ordering pluralism, notably in good faith and
with due regard for the overarching ideal of international cooperation – might
build up the political pressure needed for promoting the progressive evolution of
international law in the direction of a system more considerate of human rights.
Indeed, such domestic resistance has in the past had salutary effects in the sense
that it stimulated an improvement of the attacked regime’s fundamental rights
protection: In reaction to the German Constitutional Court’s Solange I decision, the
EC/EU formalised its scheme of fundamental rights protection culminating in the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights and – perhaps – the accession of the EU
to the ECHR. Arguably, it has been in reaction to the ECJ’s Kadi decision and its
progeny that the United Nations 1267-sanctions regime was complemented with
an ombudsman procedure (UN SC Res 1904 (2009)) which has been gradually
improved (UN SC Res. 1989 (2011)).
Superficially, the Sentenza No. 238 strengthens the position of the individual
against the state. But on a more profound level, it strengthens unilateralism over
universalism: It gives priority to one (state’s) national outlook about what constitutes
a proper legal order over the universal standard pronounced by an international
court. Concededly, this ICJ-standard is unsatisfactory and seems to be biased in
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favour of the stability of an inter-state system. On the other hand it still has the
merit of being universal. The lack of an ultimate arbiter tends to result in the political
dominance of the more powerful actors which are normally the domestic ones such
as the Italian Constiutional Court. And a stiff dualism à la Tripel and Tesauro bears
the real risk of reinforcing the perception that international law is only soft law or
even no law at all.
Despite its staunch dualism, the Corte insinuates that (somehow), the two legal
circles (to use Triepel’s term) may interact: “At the same time, however, this
[declaration of unconstitutionality] may also contribute to a desirable – and desired
by many – evolution of international law itself” (ibid., in “The law”, para. 3.3.).
However: You cannot have the cake and eat it, too.
This blog post first appeared on EJIL:Talk! and is reposted here with kind
permission.
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